SAMPLE EVALUATION

JEFFERSONIANS AND FEDERALISTS

An evaluation of

Morton Borden, “Thomas Jefferson: Political Compromiser” in Allen F. Davis and Harold Woodman (eds.), Conflict and Consensus in Early American History. 7^th Edition, Vol. I. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1988)

And

Lance Banning, “The Revolution of 1800 and the Principles of Ninety-Eight” in Allen F. Davis and Harold Woodman (eds.), Conflict and Consensus in Early American History. 7^th Edition, Vol. I. (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1988)

"Every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans -- we are all Federalists." That, at least, was how Thomas Jefferson put it upon being inaugurated as President of the United States. That was a remarkable thing for him to say, considering how vicious the campaign which resulted in his election had been. "Brethren of the same principle" hardly seemed to describe advocates of the two parties, each of which had accused the other of almost every crime and sin imaginable, and each of which had predicted that the Republic would collapse if the other were elected. Yet, Jefferson appeared to emerge from this fray as though it had never happened, not only suggesting that differences between the two forces were relatively meaningless, but proceeding to implement so much of his adversaries' programs as to elicit claims that he had "outFederalized the Federalists."

At first glance, it seemed that Jefferson might have turned his coat upon election. On the other hand, adopting his opponents' ideas would signify much less if there had never been that much difference between them in the first place. Were Federalists and Jeffersonians really "brethren of the same principle" despite all the rhetoric to the contrary?

Morton Borden in "Thomas Jefferson: Political Compromiser" answers this question with a firm "yes!" As he sees it, the differences which divided the two factions were more apparent than real, and were exaggerated by overblown rhetoric. Of course, there were differences about specific policies and personalities, and there were differences in such relatively superficial things as how basic principles should be expressed. But these were not serious, deep divisions. Most Americans were, in fact, united by a deep and important consensus. All desired "to avoid war, to quiet factionalism, and to preserve republican government." Jefferson's accession to the Presidency, therefore, marked no real change in essential values from what already prevailed, and certainly could not be called a true revolution. Jefferson was perfectly willing to compromise or abandon less important specific policies or programs he had once favored, particularly when doing so would strengthen the basic values or when not doing so might threaten them. Compromise on these kinds of things did not mark a fundamental change of course; compromise on non-essentials, rather, strengthened and deepened commitment to those essentials to which Jefferson and the Federalists were alike devoted.

Lance Banning in "The Revolution of 1800 and the Principles of Ninety-Eight" sees much the same thing, but sees it quite differently. To Banning, the differences which separated Jeffersonians and Federalists were real and fundamental. Of course Jefferson seemed to adopt some elements of the Federalist program, for the country was already committed to them, and not to continue them would be to break the word of the nation. The national bank, for example, had a firm charter, while the payment of old debts had already been guaranteed. Then too, it might be necessary to compromise on some minor issues in order to gain the support necessary to effect more important reforms. On the other hand, Jefferson truly gutted the Hamilton program where it was possible to do so, severely reducing the size of the Federal government, abolishing all internal taxes, and setting Alexander Hamilton's "blessing," the national debt, on the path to ultimate extinction. These were serious actions, reflecting fundamental disagreements between the two sides, and significantly altering the nation's course.

The extent of this peaceful revolution has usually been overlooked because historians, and some of Jefferson's own followers, have presumed that the ideas of state sovereignty and strict construction embodied in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions were the core of the Jeffersonian belief system. In fact, they were never more than an ad hoc expedient to defend basic republican principles against the assaults of the Alien and Sedition Acts and other repressive Federalist measures of 1798-99, when all other institutional protections for Constitutional rights seemed to have evaporated. Varying from these ideas did not constitute an abandonment of basic values. The core of Jeffersonianism lay in the determination to preserve the Republican ideal from corruption and prevent its slide toward monarchy. The core of Federalism was exactly what Jefferson feared: an attempt to re-create in America something resembling the King-and-Premier system of Royal England under the influence of Robert Walpole. Jefferson's election did indeed mark a revolution, for it resulted in laying that plan to rest forever, and securing a genuinely republican order for the United States.

Both these articles say much the same thing, but each places a different spin on it. Both agree that there were some fundamental things on which most Americans were united. Both agree that there were some things on which they disagreed. Where they do not agree is on which values were "fundamental" and which were not.

Borden is clearly right in his perspective, but in so general a sense as to be meaningless. He does describe a plausible consensus uniting Americans, but the issues on which it is based are right up there with motherhood, apple pie, and the flag! By defining "fundamental" things so broadly, Borden has simply defined himself out of a problem. That there may have been substantial agreement on these matters does not mean that other matters were not significant in themselves; and if Hamilton's behavior provides any evidence, it is by no means clear that Federalists and Jeffersonians were united even on these basics. Consider his agitation for war against France and his outrage at Adams's peacemaking in 1798-1800. Consider his encouragement and manipulation of factionalism in the elections of 1796 and 1800. Borden simply presumes too much and ignores too much.

Banning draws the "fundamental" line far more narrowly than Borden, but not so narrowly as traditional historians. He shows convincingly that the definition of "fundamental" issues does not extend to strict construction and state sovereignty, but that it does cover things far more specific than Borden acknowledges. The Hamiltonian program and the use of Federal power to implement it raised questions of great significance. Dealing with those questions raised issues which should indeed be considered basic to the very identity of the nation. This is a far more realistic approach than Borden's, and has the great virtue of making Republican policy seem consistent and comprehensible. It has the weakness of verging toward tautology, suggesting that it was constructed in hindsight in order to make that policy seem so.

In fact, the question itself is an artificial one. In every society, there must be some basic layer of consensus, or else the society could not exist at all. In every society, there is also some kind of conflict. The question turns on how significant every difference is, and, more importantly, how "significant" is defined. Of necessity, any such definition must be a relative one, and to some extent an arbitrary one.

My own reading of the situation is that there were hardly any Americans who were not united in the belief that the United States should remain an independent nation and a republic under the structure established by the Constitution of 1787. I also agree that few would have dissented from Borden's consensus. But there were issues of significance beyond these. By 1800, the ship of state had been built and launched. No one aboard wished it destroyed. But the ship's course had not yet been firmly set. Determining that course was no trivial matter, and it was precisely this which divided Americans politically in those years. As Banning points out, the most basic point of division among Americans centered around two related questions: 1) shall Hamilton's program, and the structure supporting it, be the shape of the nation to come; and 2) shall Federal power be interpreted and utilized to accommodate and implement such a program? It was precisely on these two points that Federalists and Jeffersonians disagreed: the former favoring the Hamiltonian program, and willing to create a powerful Federal establishment to implement it; the latter opposing it, and likewise opposing the growth of Federal power to implement it.

From this perspective, Jefferson's election is indeed a revolution, for it resulted in a significant alteration of the course. Jefferson's policies after election demonstrate this. Leaving in place those parts of Hamilton's program which were inextricably established, he moved to destroy those which could be destroyed without further damaging the nation. He severely reduced the military and diplomatic establishments. He pardoned victims of the Alien and Sedition Acts and, of course, refused to allow those acts to be renewed upon their expiration. He repealed all the excise and other internal taxes which had been the major financial base for the entire program. He ceased trying to get special subsidies and protections for business. Perhaps most telling of all, he adopted a plan to pay off the entire national debt, which Hamilton had considered a "national blessing;" succeeded in reducing it significantly, and probably would have paid it all off had expenses and income reductions arising from the crisis with England not intervened. Only from the presumption that the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions defined the differences between the two parties does Jefferson's behavior suggest a lack of significant differences or a betrayal of principles. I think Banning makes his case that the differences were much broader than that.

Perhaps every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle, but the issues dividing Federalists and Jeffersonians went far beyond those of mere opinion. Significantly, however, the dedication of both to keeping the ship afloat, whatever course it took, enabled those real and fundamental differences to be accommodated without destruction of the Constitutional order. Sixty years later, the actions of some Southerners revealed what might have happened had those fundamental conflicts not been accompanied by that common dedication.